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This article seeks to explain the ways in which the “global” environmental gov-
ernance of clean development intersects with the “local” politics of resource re-
gimes that are enrolled in carbon markets through the production and trade in
Certiªed Emissions Reductions (CERs). It shows how political structures and
decision-making procedures, which were set up at the international level to gov-
ern the acquisition of CERs through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), interact with and transform national and local level politi-
cal ecologies in host countries where very different governance structures, pol-
itical networks, and state-market relations operate. It draws on literature within
political ecology to understand how the creation of global carbon markets po-
tentially disrupts and changes local social and ecological relations through im-
pacts on property rights, access to resources, and notions of value and justice
that exist in a diversity of sectors and settings that the CDM touches through its
global reach. Drawing on ªeld work in Argentina and Honduras, we illustrate
the politics of translation1 that occur when the social and environmental conse-
quences of decisions made within global governance mechanisms such as the
CDM are followed through to particular sites in the global political economy
and, at the same time, how social relations and environmental conditions in
those sites affect the global politics of the CDM.
The article combines an attempt to simultaneously map out empirical
connections and develop theoretical tools for making sense of the political ecol-
ogies of the CDM within the context of global environmental politics. We argue
that political ecology offers a rich set of resources for such an enquiry because of
its focus on the embeddedness of environmental conºicts within broader social
relations, which simultaneously inºuence the effectiveness of global climate
governance and, in turn, are affected by the global regime.
* We are grateful to the three anonymous referees for their feedback on an earlier version of this
article, and to Jon Phillips for detailed comments and suggestions.
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Global Environmental Governance and Political Ecology
What does a landªll site on the outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina, or a hydro-
electric project in rural Honduras have to do with global environmental gover-
nance (GEG)? The answer to this question lies in carbon markets, which fund
and oversee greenhouse gas emissions reduction projects and trade the credits
they generate through the CDM. People, resources, and the ecologies of which
they are a part are now being enrolled more directly into structures and pro-
cesses of GEG in ways that generate methodological and theoretical challenges
for conventional forms of enquiry in the ªeld of global environmental politics
(GEP).
Methodologically, there is the challenge of tracking and tracing the institu-
tions, actors, and networks that connect “global” environmental politics to par-
ticular “local” outcomes. These involve a plurality of actors and intermediaries
operating across numerous sites and scales, which implies understanding the
roles of a range of nonstate actors that are not traditionally considered in
the study of GEG: lawyers, project developers, veriªcation agencies, and other
market brokers. It also demands ªeld work in sites that scholars of GEG rarely
venture into, including landªll sites on the edge of cities in the global South, re-
mote hydroelectric plants, and other areas far removed from decision-making in
national and international arenas. Considering this plurality of actors and inter-
mediaries constitutes unfamiliar territory for many scholars of global politics,
yet understanding the reach of global carbon markets requires it.
The process of enrolling actors and their resources into global markets
does not necessarily occur in a passive or reluctant way; some entrepreneurs po-
sition themselves to proªt from carbon trading, while others may resist this pro-
cess. The point is that connections between global decision-making processes
and local livelihoods, and the value attached to them, are subject to change
through the operations and modalities of global carbon markets. The ease with
which diverse ecologies and social systems can be subjected to the modes of
governance required to standardize and commodify carbon and trade emissions
reductions in the global climate regime affects the nature of global political re-
sponses to climate change. How do these new connections operate in practice,
what are their consequences, and how do we make sense of these relationships
theoretically?
While many scholars of GEG have focused on the global politics of carbon
markets through the CDM or emissions trading,2 few have sought to trace politi-
cally what happens when decisions are made to construct markets, approve pro-
jects, and commodify carbon. There is a rich strand of activist literature, which
seeks to expose the “climate fraud” and “climate colonialism” associated with
carbon markets.3 We lack, however, a nuanced empirical and theoretical under-
standing of the sorts of political relationships that operate across scales in car-
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bon markets and their consequences for understanding global environmental
politics and for the livelihoods of the world’s poor. We suggest work within po-
litical ecology might usefully complement literature on the political economy
of GEG in providing such an understanding.
Speciªcally, political ecology enables an understanding of (1) the “local”
social and environmental consequences of global (environmental) gover-
nance—the ideologies, discourses, structures, and interests that it embodies,
reºects, and projects; and (2) the ways in which “regimes” that govern resources
at different levels engage and transform one another through global circuits of
capital, production, and consumption. Because issues of access, property rights,
and livelihoods are affected by and enrolled in global circuits of capital, we sug-
gest that the political ecology literature provides a useful way of understanding
the consequences of neoliberal forms of environmental governance. This con-
tributes to analysis of who wins and who loses from particular global environ-
mental governance arrangements in general,4 and the CDM in particular.5 It also
engages literatures within geography concerned with how issues move across
scales and the networked nature of environmental policy.6
Insights from political ecology connect well with political economy ap-
proaches to the study of environmental governance that explicitly locate sites of
environmental decision-making within broader structures of economic and po-
litical power and the “routine and mundane” practices of capitalism as a way of
understanding the relationship between global social and economic relations
and environmental change.7 Yet, with some exceptions, there is a notable and
regrettable neglect of literatures on political ecology within the study of GEP.8
We suggest that such literatures provide a series of useful insights that merit fur-
ther engagement and reªnement. We argue that the globalizing reach of interna-
tional regimes and their role in creating markets in, and determining access to,
resources as crucial as water, energy, and seeds means that critical accounts of
GEG have to widen their analysis beyond the “international” level and conven-
tional theoretical foci to comprehend how the structures of power that shape
and circumscribe “global” environmental governance may also conªgure “lo-
cal” sites of resource governance. In turn, we also contend that these local
sites reconªgure global regimes through (1) the production (or not) of value,
(2) struggles over symbolic meaning (whether projects can successfully be
showcased as examples of the beneªts of carbon markets, or highlighted for
their potential to dispossess the poor), and (3) acts of resistance from social
groups or “uncooperative” nature that prove difªcult to commodify.
We note the need, therefore, to build on those strands of political ecology
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which explore the “global” political and spatial dimensions of struggles and
thereby escape the “local trap” that befalls some work in the political ecology
tradition.9 We argue that political ecology accounts of how local conºicts are
embodied in broader structures of social and political power, including global
environmental regimes and the interests and structures they reºect and consoli-
date, are best placed to make a contribution to this line of enquiry. It is through
exploring the nature of the relationship between macro- and site-speciªc dy-
namics that interesting theoretical and practical insights might be derived.
The carbon economy offers a paradigmatic case for exploring empirically
and theoretically the connections between global and local political ecologies,
markets, and structures of governance. It offers a highly advanced instance of
marketized environmental policy and the sorts of multi-scalar politics which
political ecology approaches usefully capture. Political networks enroll a diver-
sity of actors in practices of commodiªcation, veriªcation, and legitimation,
processes central to the functioning of carbon markets. But they also create a
politics of resistance to further commodiªcation of the atmosphere, which itself
shapes markets.10 We draw on two case studies of CDM projects in Argentina
and Honduras to illustrate the ways in which work on political ecology contrib-
utes towards understanding the global-local relationships they embody. The
cases—urban waste in Argentina and rural hydroelectricity in Honduras—are
chosen to reveal the different social and ecological dynamics at play in the pro-
duction of offsets in distinct sectors and around urban-rural poverty dynamics
in the two countries. They are situated in a region that has a common history of
social mobilization around natural resources but has, thus far, with the excep-
tion of Brazil, not been a leading host of CDM projects.
Political Ecology
At its broadest, political ecology seeks to provide a framework for understand-
ing human-environment relations.11 More speciªcally, it examines the interrela-
tions of politics and power, structures, and discourses with the environment.12
Here, our interest is primarily identifying and engaging with those elements,
which offer a bridge to international political economy (IPE) and critical tradi-
tions within GEP; that is, the more materialist political ecologies that posit link-
ages between ecologies and the economies of which they are a part.13 In so do-
ing we do not exclude the possibility that other strands of political ecology
thinking might be used in similar and equally productive ways. In addition to
political ecology work that examines the practices of commodiªcation of so-
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called neoliberal natures,14 we also draw on more classic political ecology con-
cerns around issues of access to material and natural resources, and questions of
equity and justice issues in the negotiation and distribution of social and envi-
ronmental beneªts at multiple scales.15
Our aim then is to enhance existing strands of work on global political
ecology, and to apply their insights to the case of the CDM. This includes the
strand of political ecology thinking which developed in the wake of, and by
way of response to, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 associated with the work
of Wolfgang Sachs, Nicolas Hildyard, Vandana Shiva and others. In the words of
Wolfgang Sachs, this work critiques the “discourse of global ecology that has de-
veloped that is largely devoid of any consideration of power relations, cultural au-
thenticity and moral choice” and which “promotes the aspirations of a rising eco-
cracy to manage nature and regulate people worldwide.”16 More recently it would
include research which uses political ecology to examine global environmental
discourses17 or work that “emphasizes global political economy as a main causal
theme.”18 Studies of the World Bank (WB), the Global Environment Facility
(GEF),19 and other initiatives aimed at marketizing environmental services20 help
to illuminate the same sorts of logics, institutions, and dynamics that characterize
efforts to roll out the CDM as a legitimate response to climate change.
Given that site- and resource-speciªc conºicts increasingly result from and
are embedded with global conªgurations of politics and social forces, we sug-
gest how strands of critical IPE, which help to explain the constitution of carbon
markets and the governance arrangements set up to support them,21 might use-
fully connect with local political ecologies, which show how broader structures
of power are present and reproduced in struggles around natural resources.22
Political ecology’s focus on material, institutional, and discursive practices com-
plements in many ways neo-Gramscian framings of power in GEP, which ex-
plore expressions of power through governance arrangements that seek to glob-
alize particular sets of material and political interests.23 As with all hegemonic
projects, carbon markets require strategies of accommodation to bring on board
critics and make concessions in the name of preserving the power of an historic
bloc and to maintain their status as “common sense” solutions to the problem
of climate change. Hegemony is never complete, however, and acts of resistance
to carbon markets serve to remake them,24 producing legitimacy crises that their
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advocates then have to address. Exposés of projects that do meet CDM addition-
ality requirements, for example, produce efforts to create new procedures and
standards to safeguard the credibility of the market as a whole.25 Work within
political ecology is also attuned to the ways in which globalizing projects are re-
sisted and rejected, or reworked into more positive local impacts. These high-
light, for example, how people create opportunities within the global carbon
economy by “maneuvering through and ªnding spaces at the interstices of the
same political economy that in other ways simultaneously constrains and struc-
tures their agency.”26
Governing the Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM is a project-based offset mechanism whereby developed country in-
vestors can reduce their greenhouse gas compliance obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol by reducing emissions below a business as usual baseline in develop-
ing countries. Central to this system is the concept of additionality, which refers
to the need for the project to prove it is above and beyond business as usual sce-
narios for emissions reductions. It relies, therefore, on a counterfactual assess-
ment of regulatory, technological, and ªnancial barriers to the uptake of low-
carbon (and carbon equivalent) opportunities.
The main driver for the CDM is the regulatory framework of the Kyoto
Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, which accepts
CDM credits as a part of its compliance efforts. The CDM is accountable to the
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and is regulated by the CDM Executive Board. Its daily governance, how-
ever, is enacted by a plethora of business, government, community, and individ-
ual actors that span the globe. These include national-level designated national
authorities (DNAs) that have to approve projects, project developers such as the
ªrm Eco-securities, and designated operational entities (DOEs)—ªrms such as
DNV, Tüv Sud, and SGS that are charged with validating project design docu-
ments for approval by governments, and the CDM Executive Board. A different
DOE from that which validated the project then also veriªes the emissions re-
ductions that have been paid for. In addition to emissions reductions, the CDM
is mandated to contribute to sustainable development, as deªned by host coun-
tries. In practice it does this in a highly uneven way in terms of the distribution
of projects across sectors and regions; just two countries, India and China,
capture over 65 percent of the registered projects, while African countries were
home to less than 2 percent of CDM projects in 2011.27
The CDM grew rapidly from virtually nothing in the early 2000s to pro-
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ducing credits with a value of US$6.5 billion in 200828 and represents a sig-
niªcant attempt to roll out a market on a global scale. We see in the creation of
carbon markets many of the dynamics of capitalism in general at work.29 One of
the means by which carbon is made to count and, therefore, which enables it
to circulate in commodity form, is through elaborate systems of accounting,
benchmarking, and measurement. An intricate politics is implied by attempts to
commodify carbon (and other greenhouse gases). Carbon has to be rendered
manageable, containable and quantiªable, fungible in value, and commensu-
rate to be tradable as a commodity.30 What appear as mere technical exercises in
measuring, accounting, and verifying emissions are deeply political because of
the ªnancial value they can generate, the politics of what gets measured and
what does not, the judgments that are made about where to invest, and what
sustainable development beneªts are expected to ºow from particular projects.31
Project developers and veriªers, operating in many different countries, im-
port and export standards, norms, and lessons from one project to the next. Yet,
at the same time, they encounter a speciªc set of issues, actors, and distinct po-
litical ecologies that differ hugely by setting, which they have to negotiate and
manage. They also have to navigate varieties of clean development governance,
whereby national governments employ different criteria of sustainable develop-
ment and where uneven state capacity to process applications for projects and
monitor their implementation is apparent.32
More controversial, however, is the claim that carbon markets reproduce
the tendency in neoliberalism to capitalize upon existing inequalities, and in so
doing further entrench them, as new patterns of accumulation are enabled in
the name of climate policy.33 Others, however, have shown how carbon ªnance
can help scale up local economies with potentially beneªcial outcomes.34 CDM
projects can, therefore, be both locally empowering and disempowering de-
pending on the speciªc political, economic, social, and ecological contexts in
which projects are implemented.
This suggests that we need to understand negotiations around socioeco-
nomic and ecological value and how the distribution of beneªts is fought over.
The question of what does and does not count as clean development is, there-
fore, not just an issue for international institutions. Carbon ªnance and CDM
projects are received and understood in relation to preexisting socioeconomic,
environmental and political priorities, relations and institutions around forests,
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energy, and waste which, if they are to be effective, they have to engage and
transform. It is to these that we now turn.
The following section provides insights into the political ecology of two
distinct sites in the global political economy of the CDM: Argentina and Hon-
duras. We use these cases to highlight the beneªts to be gained from using polit-
ical ecology to understand the global environmental politics of carbon offsets.
The analysis is based on ªeldwork in Argentina and Honduras involving multi-
ple interviews, document analysis, and direct observation. Rather than making
claims about their generalizability to the wider population of CDM projects, we
aim to show how the apparently local socioeconomic and environmental poli-
tics they describe interact with the global politics of the CDM and how this can
usefully be understood by drawing on relevant themes from political ecology.
Clean Development in Argentina: The Political Ecology of Rubbish
Argentina is a country with extensive potential to reduce emissions and move
towards lower carbon development, much of which is unrealized because of a
complex mix of structural and technical barriers, weak systems of governance,
and low levels of political will to propose reforms or capitalize on opportunities
to access carbon ªnance. Those CDM projects that do exist are grounded in par-
ticular political ecologies, which we explore here through a case study of a
landªll gas project to capture and ºare methane.35
Global Translations
The carbon economy has been embedded politically and institutionally in Ar-
gentina in a number of ways. In part, CDM governance in Argentina was driven
by external factors, such as the climate change negotiations. In 1998 a team of
specialists from inside and outside the government was brought together in the
run-up to COP4 (Conference of the Parties) to manage carbon projects includ-
ing Fabián Gioli, who went on to head the country’s DNA. The Oªcina de Imple-
mentacíon Conjunta (OAIJ) was set up to manage the AIJ (Activities Implemented
Jointly) projects, driven largely by the US, that prepared the ground for subse-
quent CDM projects by ensuring procedures were in place for receiving and
handling carbon-ªnanced projects.36 The country’s DNA was then set up in
2002 in the wake of the Marrakesh accords, which provided the rules and proce-
dures for the operation of the CDM. As a compliment to the Designated Na-
tional Authority, the Fondo Argentino de Carbono (FAC)37 was then set up in 2005,
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with World Bank Carbon Finance Assist money, to promote CDM projects, al-
though it had no funds to create them.
Landªll gas projects make up the largest number of CDM projects in Ar-
gentina, and the World Bank and bilateral donors have promoted them as one
of the most lucrative opportunities for attracting CDM ªnance. Yet the waste
sector connects the international negotiations on climate change to the politics
of poverty in Argentina. Attempts by Northern countries to secure maximum
ºexibility in their emissions reductions by securing opportunities for buying
credits from the global South serve, in this instance, to intensify localized
conºicts over who owns the waste and who lives with its side effects. This is be-
cause landªll gas projects in Argentina are at the center of a series of controver-
sies around the political ecology of waste and rubbish, in Buenos Aires in partic-
ular. Following the economic crisis of 2001–2002 in Argentina, many people
lost jobs and savings, and fell below the poverty line. As a result, a scavenger
economy of informal waste collectors and recyclers grew to a scale not seen be-
fore. This informal sector has created conºicts between the city mayor and
prominent businessman Mauricio Macri, who has his own interests in waste
companies and these so-called cartoneros who collect and sell cardboard.38
Local Negotiation and Contestation
The CDM enters this landscape through Coordinación Ecológica Area Metropoli-
tana Sociedad del Estado (CEAMSE), the municipal agency responsible for han-
dling the city’s waste. It is party to several of the CDM projects set up to capture
and ºare methane. Many of the sites are out of the city where “villas” (slums)
have grown up alongside them. One such site is Ensenada in La Plata, a 10-year
gas-ºaring project on a landªll site where CEAMSE claims up to 20 percent of
the 2,580,100 CERs expected to be generated by the project.39 The burning of
waste, the smell of methane emitted from the waste, and the noise and pollu-
tion caused by the constant transport of waste to and from these sites has led to
claims of ill health and even fatalities by people living alongside the site.
Conºicts between CEAMSE and the surrounding community are apparent as
you approach the Ensenada site and you are greeted with signs that accuse
CEAMSE of being asesinos (killers), or just state “No a CEAMSE.”
When discussing opposition to the site in general and to the gas project in
particular, CEAMSE ofªcials claim the “social demands” articulated by the com-
munities and the judicial proceedings instigated to close the site were not local,
but the result of outside agitators.40 This is despite project developers, the Cana-
dian ªrm Conestoga-Rovers & Associates, conceding that a lot of disquiet and
skepticism about the project was expressed in community meetings. In terms of
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CDM approval, projects are meant to engage in consultations with stakeholders
and groups that may be affected by the project. The managers of one project
were honest enough to admit that, as far as they were concerned, local consulta-
tions were largely a “check-list” process. Meetings were held and social beneªts
of the projects are claimed, but, according to the project developers, the “social
side drops off” since it is not evaluated or valued in terms of the receipt of CERs.
The CDM Executive Board and buyers of CERs want “data and quantity” and
nothing more, they claim.41
CEAMSE gets a percentage of the sale of the CERs and so, depending on
CER price, is a clear beneªciary of this new stream of revenue through carbon
markets. The project developers claim they provide a clear case of additionality,
since without this investment there would be no incentives to reduce gas emis-
sions. Beneªts are said to include local employment for people in the surround-
ing area, better than average wages, and less odor from the site as the methane is
burned off rather than released into the atmosphere.42
The issue from the point of view of the political ecology of clean develop-
ment is that, just as critics of carbon trading claim has happened elsewhere,43
CDM ªnance is alleged to have provided an extra incentive and a ªnancial life-
line to keep open a plant that many people claim is toxic and damaging their
health. Isolating the extent to which CDM ªnance, by prolonging the life of the
plant, causes or exacerbates these problems is a difªcult and contentious exer-
cise since the landªll site has been in operation since 1982 and the communi-
ties which surround it experience a range of deprivations that entrench poor
health and low levels of environmental quality. We can, nevertheless, see clear
resonances here with the environmental justice concerns in political ecology lit-
erature that polluting activities, left to the market, tend to be located in areas in-
habited by poorer people, who have less power to resist and where land is
cheaper.44
Resource Materialities
Many studies in political ecology place emphasis on the way in which the mate-
riality of a resource affects its governability and the nature of politics around it,
emphasizing the “uncooperative” nature of some resources and the way in
which nature itself has agency in shaping political economic outcomes.45 We see
these dynamics at work in this case. The nature and value of methane produc-
tion is political because areas holding the newest waste emit the most methane,
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which can be captured more easily and at lower cost.46 Firms invest vast
amounts of time and resources into constantly trying to control the balance and
interaction of gases to maximize proªts, adjusting pipes that carry methane,
CO2 and oxygen to maximize ºows of the former. “Uncooperative” methane of-
ten outmaneuvers such attempts at isolation and containment. Its composition,
dispersal, and presence is constantly monitored, and taps and pipes must to be
checked and moved to capture (and ultimately ºare) as much as possible. The
elaborate rituals of monitoring and data collection tie these attempted acts of
control directly to assessments and apportionments of value through CERs back
in Bonn at the CDM Executive Board.
Indeed, these local material difªculties are intimately tied to the global en-
vironmental politics of climate negotiations. At the project site, there is intense
pressure to ºare gas continuously, to extract maximum value in the shortest
time frame possible. This pressure is intensiªed by the drive to issue CERs be-
fore 2012, the end of Kyoto’s ªrst commitment period, since a second period
has yet to be agreed. It can take one year between ªnal approval of all claimed
savings and the release of all CERs; hence global climate governance enters the
equation again. International veriªers come to the site to check readings, which
are also sent every two minutes to Land Tec in the United States, where data on
the mix of gases and speed of transfer is stored. Elaborate systems of recording,
maintenance, and security (to help prevent theft from the site) are put in place
to ensure that CER revenues are generated as smoothly as possible from the site.
This short case study shows how the CDM and the actors and networks
that underpin it become embroiled in the political ecology of waste and local-
ized struggles over access, value, and property that shape the functioning of the
carbon market. The local political ecology of waste inºuences the extent to
which surplus value can be generated and capital accumulated, as well the credi-
bility and legitimacy of claims about the ability of projects to create social
beneªts for poorer groups. But it is clear from the brief discussion here that we
should be cautious not to underestimate the agency and resilience of existing
political networks of actors and interests that are able to resist or coopt attempts
to govern resources in new ways. Such conceptions are a key tenet of political
ecology and are important in understanding the extent to which, and ways in
which, global carbon ªnance mechanisms get reworked in local contexts.
Clean Development in Honduras: The Political Ecology of Energy
Honduras is the second-largest country in Central America, but in 2007 it ranked
third-lowest on the human development index among Central American coun-
tries, after Guatemala and Haiti.47 High levels of poverty, export-led growth, and
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large renewable energy potential made Honduras an ideal target for carbon
ªnance. Honduras was involved early in the CDM, hosting the ªrst registered
CDM project,48 and creating streamlined governmental processes for CDM ap-
provals as early as 2005.49 Despite this early engagement, in 2010 Honduras
hosted only 4 percent of Latin America’s CDM projects, and, as of 2010, was set to
only produce 1 percent of CER volume from Latin America by 2012, from a total
of 29 projects (of which 9 are methane avoidance, 8 biomass energy, and 11 hy-
droelectric).50 Low continuity in government administration has led to a patchy
policy framework, which has contributed to impeding effective implementation.
Sustainable development priorities for CDM projects in Honduras are not
speciªc to carbon ªnance, and instead are deªned by broader national govern-
ment priorities for development. Although environmental impact assessments
have to be made under Honduran law, national policies do not provide speciªc
details on beneªts for local communities, especially the rural and urban poor.
As a local project developer noted, the law states that “you have to provide so-
cial beneªts . . . [but] some local and some foreign companies do and some
don’t. The government doesn’t check up on it.”51 These loosely deªned “social
projects” to beneªt communities, although mandated by law, are not speciªed,
nor veriªed under standard CDM projects.
Like the case in Argentina, the project is negotiated at multiple levels. In
the case of the CDM hydroelectric project analyzed here, the distribution of
socio-political power and its use in the negotiation of development associated
with the implementation of the project occurred at three principal levels:
through the World Bank’s connection to the project via carbon ªnance; the un-
equal distribution of local assets valuable to the project developers; and the
unequal distribution of capacity among local communities to organize and ne-
gotiate access to beneªts.
Global Translations
The international climate regime shapes local material development through
the actions of project developers, veriªers, and consultants working under the
incentives of the CDM, largely bypassing the nation state, except for signing-off
on the letter of approval under the CDM. Clean development projects that are
promoted internationally as supporting community development may rely on
local company operations, corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, or
speciªc carbon offset co-beneªts to create development beneªts. The case study
of a small-scale Honduran CDM hydroelectric project52 shows how local politics
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mix with the broader carbon economy and the global politics of the CDM, how
global politics are instilled in local actions, and how, through retelling local de-
velopment stories, the local politics of clean development affect the global.
CDM projects embody multiple aspirations for different attributes at
different scales, including carbon credit generation, revenue generation, and
speciªc local development considerations. For example, the Emissions Reduc-
tion Purchase Agreement for the micro-hydroelectric project in Honduras noted
that the project was to reforest the local watershed, provide employment and
training activities for local workers, and electrify local communities. Contrary to
some other small-scale community development-driven carbon offsets,53 how-
ever, local communities were not paid directly for their role in generating car-
bon credits in the project, although they were important in providing the eco-
system services (such as watershed protection) and operational services (such as
a cheap labor force) that the facility requires to run effectively.
Local Negotiation and Contestation
The engagement of international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) in
the new carbon economy and their promotion of these mechanisms in develop-
ing countries provide a conduit to understand the stark differences between lo-
cal, national and international understandings of what constitutes clean devel-
opment. Although national politics encouraged incoming ªnance for the CDM
in Honduras, a lack of local awareness of the importance of the speciªc project
in promoting the role of global offset markets meant that local governments did
not use the project’s position as a carbon offset to negotiate improved beneªts.
Initially, communities were not actively engaged or informed that the
project ofªcially existed as part of the CDM; community engagement was for
operational reasons only. The WB Carbon Finance Unit stipulated minimum re-
quirements for local development, but these did not go beyond business as
usual activities for the CDM project developer.54 Given the market orientation
of the CDM, as we saw in the Argentinean case, carbon must come ªrst.55 WB
governance of the project meant that development assistance for local commu-
nities was contingent on the willingness of communities to assist the project in
order to facilitate the effective running of the hydroelectric dam, and, therefore,
its generation of CERs for the WB and its clients.
For this reason, local contestation directly inºuenced global politics. De-
spite the project developer’s involvement in community development, beyond
that stipulated by the WB, some conºict in negotiations between the developer,
municipality and local indigenous associations led the WB to intervene because
of the project’s high proªle position as an early CDM project. As a result, WB
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employees visited, held a meeting, and mandated an increase in monitoring of
the management of the project. An increase of US$1 per ton CO2emissions sold
was negotiated to help pay for improved local monitoring, and to assist in the
communication between the project developers and local organizations, help-
ing to mitigate the project’s position as a potential liability to the WB’s portfolio
of successful development-oriented carbon offsets.56 The intervention illustrates
how local politics and negotiations between the private and public sector and
local indigenous communities became globally signiªcant because of the sym-
bolic and material value attached to the project in the WB’s emerging portfolio
of carbon funds, which aimed to demonstrate the effectiveness of carbon mar-
kets as a response to climate change. The agency of local actors in resisting and
reworking incoming ºows of ªnance associated with the global environmental
regime became key determinants of the material outcomes of the project both
locally and internationally.
Resource Materialities
In the context of the CDM, there are also (bio)physical dimensions which un-
derpin the political ecology of clean development. Capital projects take place in
speciªc locations according to certain advantageous characteristics for the ex-
traction of proªt from natural or human resources.57 The relationship between
the material success of the hydroelectric dam, the physical geography of local
communities, and the ability of local communities to assist in the success of the
facility affected the capacity of some communities to beneªt over others. Com-
munities situated next to project facilities that provided workers for the con-
struction of the hydroelectric plant and situated close to the main electricity line
beneªted the most. Other communities, however, had to rely on a combination
of organization and negotiation because of their relative geographic position.
For example, reforestation was essential to the project success because of limited
water containment and the need for steady supply from the watershed; commu-
nities that organized and leveraged their valuable watersheds had the power to
bargain and negotiate more development beneªts from the project developer,
such as electriªcation. As a result, some communities were better able than oth-
ers to reconcile incoming clean development ªnance with local livelihood and
development needs. Local sociopolitical and material factors have direct and
important implications for the real workings of CDM projects, just as more suc-
cessful case studies are mobilized to support claims in global arenas to promote
carbon ªnance as a means of delivering clean development. Analysis of the
CDM must, therefore, account for these highly localized political negotiations
as part and parcel of the daily enacting of global environmental governance.
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Conclusion
A political ecology approach highlights the need to understand how local con-
texts are inºuenced and become part of global processes, but also how local
agency and context inºuence wider structures. Capturing the interplay be-
tween dynamic social and ecological relations across scales adds an important
dimension to discussions on GEG given the increasingly multi-scalar nature of
climate change governance.58
We have seen how regimes of governance and resource control, with their
own networks of actors, conºicts of interests, and programs of regulation,
shape, and are shaped by the “global” governance of the CDM. Political ecology
accounts provide a nuanced sense of how power and value ºow through these
networks of decision-making and how and why global priorities and intentions,
once refracted through national and subnational political processes, look very
different on the ground. In particular we have been able to show that projects
governed by similar processes within the UN climate regime, and involving sim-
ilar ensembles of project developers, ªnanciers, and veriªers, manifest very dif-
ferent outcomes because of the distinct social processes and diverse ecologies
they encounter and with which they have to negotiate in order to be able to ex-
tract value.
We suggest that these cases affect, and are a consequence of, the conduct of
global politics. This interaction occurs as market entrepreneurs move across
scales and participate in consultations with the CDM Executive Board, repre-
senting the local globally and vice versa, or in the way in which local political
ecologies affect the scope of other countries to reduce their own emissions
though offsets. These interactions also occur indirectly in the way speciªc pro-
jects come to be represented as successes, for example by showcasing what car-
bon markets can do for the poor, or as cases of the social and environmental
damage that can be done by extending the logics of commodiªcation. As value
is increasingly placed on local conditions in specialized markets for “high devel-
opment” or “social” carbon, their fetishization intensiªes both opportunities to
gain from the carbon economy, while also heightening the prospect of conºict
over access to resources.
Although carbon markets and the CDM perhaps represent an emblematic
case of the connections we identify as important and in need of explanation, be-
cause they explicitly tie emissions reductions obligations on the part of the
North to concrete actions in the global South, it is no doubt the case that other
areas of (global) environmental governance might also be appropriately studied
in this way. The regime on biosafety and biodiversity and on the use of persis-
tent organic compounds each impact on the patterns of exchange and use value
in the global economy, which touch, directly and indirectly, the lives of many
millions of people not considered formally part of the regime. This pattern
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reafªrms the importance of thinking about what counts as global as a causal
rather than primarily or exclusively as a spatial category,59 and suggests that,
viewed this way, the tools and approaches we have drawn attention to here
might be of use to scholars working on other issue areas or in other parts of the
world.
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